This paper analyzes preferences in the presence of ambiguity that are rational in the sense of satisfying the classical ordering condition as well as monotonicity. Under technical conditions that are natural in an Anscombe-Aumann environment, we show that even for such general preference model it is possible to identify a set of priors, as first envisioned by Ellsberg (1961). We then discuss ambiguity attitudes, as well as unambiguous acts and events, for the class of rational preferences we consider.
for the study of these issues, precisely because they do not incorporate any specific assumption about invariance and/or attitudes toward ambiguity. We show that MBA preferences admit a "generalized Hurwicz (or α-MEU) representation," thus extending an analogous result established by GMM for preferences satisfying Certainty Independence. This representation provides a useful tool to study, for instance, comparative ambiguity attitudes. Then, we discuss two different notions of ambiguity aversion and the relations between them. Finally, we propose a behavioral definition of unambiguous acts, and characterize it in terms of the set of priors we identify. We then define unambiguous events, and again provide a functional characterization.
Related literature
As outlined above, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) showing that the (arguably) most general rationality assumptions for choice under ambiguity guarantee the existence of a set of priors, first envisioned by Ellsberg (1961) and modeled in the seminal papers of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Bewley (2002) ; 2) the discussion of ambiguity attitudes in such general context; 3) the characterization of unambiguous acts and events and some consequences thereof.
In respect to the first contribution, our debt to the GMM paper is obvious. The added contribution here is clearly in showing how (most of) the representation results of that paper generalize to rational preferences which do not satisfy Certainty Independence, but only Risk Independence. The GS paper is complementary to the present one. Its main focus is the characterization of the set of relevant priors for popular preference models. Such characterizations hinge on a differential result which requires a stronger continuity condition, and thus applies only to a subset of MBA preferences, which GS dub MBC (where C stands for " [Cauchy] continuous").
The C3M paper is also complementary to the present one, because its main focus is the analysis of rational preferences which also satisfy Schmeidler's "Uncertainty Aversion" axiom. C3M also characterize the set of relevant priors in several ways (but, their differential characterization is different from the one in GS).
The discussion on ambiguity attitudes is also related to earlier work. We show how the ideas in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) can be extended to the MBA class of preferences. We refer to 4 that paper for detailed discussion on the relation of such vision of ambiguity aversion to those spoused in other papers, in particular Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein (1999) .
As to this paper's third contribution, this paper comes within a well established literature.
Early attempts to characterize behaviorally ambiguity were focussed on ambiguity of events in specific preference models. Such is the case of Nehring (1999) and Zhang (2002) , which consider CEU preferences. Subsequently, Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Nehring (2001) offered definitions of unambiguous event which apply in principle to any preference, providing a characterization over rich state spaces. Nehring's proposal is particularly relevant to our paper since it can be shown to be equivalent to the one offered here. The Epstein-Zhang definition, on the other hand, is markedly different from ours. We refer the reader to section 5.3, and especially to Nehring (2006) and Amarante and Filiz (2007) for discussion on the relations between the definition of unambiguous event presented here, Zhang's and Epstein-Zhang's. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous paper that provides a definition of unambiguous act as primitive, and events as derivative, is Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . However, their definition only applies to preferences which are ambiguity averse (or loving) according to the definition in that paper. For such preferences, the definition of unambiguous act offered in the two papers can be shown to coincide.
Finally, some of the consequences that we draw from our definitions of ambiguity owe to previous work, and our debts and contributions are clearly identified in the respective sections.
Notation and preliminaries
We consider a state space S, endowed with an algebra Σ. The notation B 0 (Σ, Γ) indicates the set of simple Σ-measurable real functions on S with values in the interval 2 Γ ⊂ , endowed with the topology induced by the supremum norm; for simplicity, write B 0 (Σ, ) as B 0 (Σ).
The set of finitely additive probabilities on Σ is denoted ba 1 (Σ). The (relative) weak * topology on ba 1 (Σ) is the topology induced by B 0 (Σ) or, equivalently, by B (Σ).
A functional I : B 0 (Σ, Γ) → is: 2 Which may be open or closed on the left or right, and may also be unbounded on one or both sides.
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• monotonic if I (a ) ≥ I (b ) for all a ≥ b
• continuous if it is sup-norm continuous
• normalized if I (α 1 S ) = α for all α ∈ Γ Next, fix a convex subset X of a vector space. (Simple) acts are Σ-measurable functions f : S → X such that f (S) = { f (s ) : s ∈ S} is finite; the set of all (simple) acts is denoted by . We define mixtures of acts pointwise: for any α ∈ [0, 1], αf +(1−α)g is the act that delivers the prize αf (s ) + (1 − α)g (s ) in state s . Given f , g ∈ and A ∈ Σ, we denote by f A g the act in which yields f (s ) for s ∈ A and g (s ) for s ∈ A c ≡ S \ A.
Rational preferences and relevant priors: characterizations
In this section we first briefly introduce our basic assumptions on preferences, characterizing what we earlier dubbed the "MBA" model. (We refer the reader to GS and C3M for more detailed discussion of the axioms.) Then we show that for MBA preferences the unambiguous preference relation introduced by GMM can be used to obtain a set of possible probabilistic models of the decision problem that might be employed by the decision maker the relevant priors.
Axioms
The main object of interest is a bynary relation on . As usual, (resp. ∼) denotes the asymmetric (resp. symmetric) component of , and we abuse notation by identifying the prize x and the constant act that delivers x for every s .
Axiom 1 (Weak Order)
The relation is nontrivial, complete, and transitive on .
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) If f , g ∈ and f (s ) g (s ) for all s ∈ S then f g .
These two axioms define rational preferences. Next two axioms are tailored to the AnscombeAumann setup we are considering.
As it is well-known, the above two axioms, in addition to the ones characterizing rational preferences, imply the existence of:
• a Bernoulli utility index on X ; that is, u : X → which is affine and represents the restriction of to X ;
• the existence of certainty equivalents x f for all acts f ∈ .
A binary relation on that satisfies Axioms 1-4 will henceforth be called an MBA preference (for Monotonic, Bernoullian, Archimedean).
We now provide a basic representation result for the preferences satisfying the above axioms. It generalizes previous results of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , GMM, GS and C3M, which all impose more stringent axiomatic requirements on preferences.
Proposition 1 A preference relation satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if there exists a nonconstant, affine function u : X → and a monotonic, normalized, continuous functional I :
Moreover, if (I v , v ) also satisfies Eq. (1), and
Observe that differently from Lemma 1 in GMM, the functional I is not necessarily constantlinear. 3 I therefore depends upon the normalization chosen for the utility function (see Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2005) ). On the other hand, thanks to normalization, I is uniquely determined by u and the equality I u f = I u x f 1 S = u x f .
3 I is constant-linear if and only if I (αa + β 1 S ) = αI (a ) + β for all a ∈ B 0 (Σ, u (X )), α, β ∈ , α > 0, such that
Relevant priors and unambiguous preferences
We now recall GMM's notion of "unambiguous preference" relation (see also Nehring, 2007) .
The more general preference setting notwithstanding, such relation has the same interpretation as in GMM: since ambiguity sensitivity may lead to violations of the Anscombe-Aumann independence axiom, we look for rankings that are not reversed by mixtures.
Definition 1 Let f , g ∈ . We say that f is unambiguously preferred to g , denoted f * g , if and only if, for all h ∈ and all λ ∈ (0, 1], λf
The relation * enjoys the properties identified by GMM (see their Props. 4 and 5), and hence, as in GMM, it admits a representation à la Bewley (2002) Proposition 2 For any MBA preference , there exists a non-empty, unique, convex and weak * -
where u is the function obtained in Proposition 1. Moreover, C is independent of the choice of normalization of u .
The last sentence -which follows from the structure of the Bewley-style representation and the uniqueness of C given u -shows that C is cardinally invariant, even though I is not.
Thus, the unambiguous preference gives rise to a set of priors, which GMM interpret as the (subjective) ambiguity revealed by the decision maker's preferences. We refer the reader to that paper for discussion of the appropriateness of such interpretation.
GS propose a behavioral definition of the set of priors that are relevant for the individual's primitive preference relation ; they then show that the resulting set is precisely C , and also
show that the arguments provided by GMM in support of their interpretation of C as revealed ambiguity extend to the preferences they study. We refer the interested reader to GS for details;
we shall sometimes implicitly invoke GS' equivalence result and thus refer to C as the set of "relevant priors."
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We now turn to the first consequence of the general representation results of the previous section. We show that that the generalized α-MEU representation suggested by GMM, which is in the spirit of Hurwicz's "pessimism index" model Hurwicz (1951) , extends to MBA preferences, and so does its interpretation in terms of comparative ambiguity. Thus, throughout this section, is an MBA preference, represented by the pair (I , u ) as per Proposition 1 and with relevant priors C as per Proposition 2.
We first introduce convenient notation. For any measure Q ∈ ba 1 (Σ) and function a ∈ B (Σ), let Q(a ) = a dQ. Also, given a weak * closed set D ⊂ ba 1 (Σ) and function a ∈ B (Σ), let
ized, constant-linear and concave (resp. convex) functional on B (Σ). We then get the following immediate Corollary of the previous representation results.
Corollary 3 For every
A second piece of terminology is useful. GMM deem an act crisp if, intuitively, it cannot be used to hedge the ambiguity of any other act. GMM formalize this intuition via a behavioral condition that indirectly relies upon Certainty Independence; since MBA preferences do not necessarily satisfy this property, we require a slightly stronger definition: we deem an act crisp if it is unambiguously indifferent to a constant. 4 Formally, denote by ∼ * the symmetric compo-
The characterization of crispness in terms of C follows.
Corollary 4 An act f ∈ is crisp if and only if
We can now provide the sought generalized α-MEU representation. Given a normalized representation (I , u ) of an MBA preference , define an ambiguity index α :
for every non-crisp function a ∈ B b (Σ, u (X )); by convention, let α(a ) = 1 2 for every crisp function a . The following result is then immediately proved.
Proposition 5 Let be an MBA preference. Then there exist a non-empty, weak * -closed, and convex set C ⊂ ba 1 (Σ), a non-constant, affine function u : X → , and a function α :
and (ii) u and C represent * in the sense of Prop. 2. Furthermore, for all non-crisp functions rather than of utility profiles, then it is also unique (for non-crisp acts). More precisely, it is invariant to cardinal transformations of the utility function u . It is worth recalling that GMM define the ambiguity index α(·) over (equivalence classes of) acts, rather than functions.
Since the functional I derived in Proposition 1 is not necessarily constant-linear, the functional α does not have the same structure as in GMM. There, it is shown that, for any two acts
For MBA preferences such equality only obtains under the more restric-
Ambiguity aversion
Here we consider the characterization of ambiguity attitudes for MBA preferences. We first show that, as it transpired from our choice of terminology, and consistently with the analysis in GMM, the function α can be interpreted as an index of ambiguity aversion:
is, the more averse to the ambiguity entailed by f is the decision maker. "More averse to ambiguity" here is in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002, to which the reader is referred for explanation and discussion; GM henceforth): We say that preference 1 is more averse to ambiguity than 2 if for all f ∈ and all x ∈ X , f 1 x implies f 2 x . The comparison is made between preferences which display the same relevant priors C and utility u , or equivalently (see GMM, Proposition 6, which generalizes immediately to our case), for any f , g ∈ ,
We then immediately obtain: 5
Proposition 6 (GMM, Proposition 12) Let 1 and 2 be MBA preferences, and suppose that 1 and 2 reveal identical ambiguity. Then 1 is more ambiguity averse than 2 if and only if for
Notice that, since as observed the function α may not be independent of the choice of the normalization of utility, here we first normalize the two utility functions to be identical, 6 and then perform the comparison of the α functions.
Turning to an absolute notion of ambiguity aversion, we recall that GM (in this differing from Epstein (1999) , see the discussion in their paper) suggest using subjective expected utility preferences as a benchmark for ambiguity neutrality, and propose the following axiomatic definition of ambiguity aversion:
Axiom 5 (Ambiguity Aversion) There exists a SEU preference that agrees with on X and such that, for all f ∈ and x ∈ X ,
That is, a preference is ambiguity averse if it is more ambiguity averse than some SEU preference that displays the same risk attitudes. 7
5 Here and henceforth, for results which are straightforward extension of existing results we omit the proof and provide a reference to the existing result.
6 Eq. (3) implies that the Bernoullian utilities are cardinally equivalent, thus equality of utility is w.l.o.g. 7 To further clarify, we consider SEU preferences à la Anscombe-Aumann, rather than à la Savage.
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The characterization of ambiguity aversion given by GM immediately generalizes to MBA preferences. A piece of terminology first. Given an MBA preference with a representation (I , u ), define Core(I ) = {P ∈ ba 1 (Σ) : ∀a ∈ B 0 (Σ, u (X )), I (a ) ≤ P(a )} and
These correspond to the game-theoretic notions when the preference is CEU, but not other- The GM proposal is not the most popular definition of ambiguity aversion in the literature.
The following notion, proposed by Schmeidler (1989) , claims that title. It imposes convexity of preferences. 8
Axiom 6 (Convexity) If f , g ∈ and α ∈ (0, 1) then
These two notions of aversion to ambiguity are a priori different. Indeed, GM present an example (Example 25) of an ambiguity averse MBA preference which is not convex, while the following is an example of a convex MBA preference which is not ambiguity averse.
Example 1 Suppose X = and consider S = {s 1 , s 2 }. Further, suppose Σ is the power set. Then, we can identify each element P ∈ b a 1 (Σ) with the number P({s 1 }). For this reason, without loss of generality, we use P for either the number and the probability distribution. Next, consider the preference over represented by the functional V : → defined by
where c 1 , c 2 :
and c 2 (P) = 1 + P. It is immediate to see that c 1 is affine and continuous and c 2 is affine and continuous. Note also that u does not appear because it is the identity. Moreover, min P∈b a 1 (Σ) c 1 (P) = 1 2 > 0 and max P∈b a 1 (Σ) c 1 (P) = 1 while min P∈b a 1 (Σ) c 2 (P) = 1. By C3M (Corollary 22), is an MBA preference that satisfies convexity.
However, in light of the discussion in Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2009) , is ambiguity averse only if arg max c 1 ∩ arg min c 2 = ∅, which is clearly not satisfied in our case.
However, the next result shows that a connection exists between the two notions of aversion to ambiguity: convexity amounts to ambiguity aversion holding "locally" for every act. For convenience, we restrict attention to MBA preferences for which there is no worst consequence:
that is, for every x ∈ X there is y ∈ X such that x y . Given a representation (I , u ) as in Prop. 1, this is equivalent to the condition that inf x ∈X u (x ) ∈ u (X ). 9
Theorem 8 For an MBA preference that has no worst consequence, the following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) for each f ∈ , there is a SEU preference f such that, for all g ∈ ,
In view of Theorem 8, Axiom 6 implies the following weak version of Axiom 5: at each x ∈ X there is a SEU preference x such that, for all g ∈ ,
Relative to Axiom 5, here the SEU preference x depends on x . Hence, Axiom 6 actually implies
Axiom 5 for all preferences where this dependence can be removed. It is useful to reformulate this condition by introducing the sets
In other words, S (x ) is the collection of all SEU preferences that are more uncertainty averse than at x . Using these sets, we can say that Axiom 6 implies Axiom 5 provided
Such is the case for CEU preferences, for which as observed by Ghirardato and Marinacci Axiom 6 implies Axiom 5.
Does B stand for Biseparable?
MBA preferences share some of the properties of what Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) call "biseparable" preferences. In our context, a preference is biseparable if there exists a unique capacity ρ : Σ → such that, given any representation (I , u ) of , with I normalized, we have for any binary act x A y with x y ,
Biseparability thus requires that the "decision weight" attached to the event A in the evaluation of any bet x A y be independent of the prizes x and y (provided x y ). Also observe that biseparability is a property of preferences, not of their representation: Eq. (4) is equivalent to the
, where the r.h.s. of this indifference is a mixture of the prizes x and y . Hence, the capacity ρ is also independent of the choice of u . 10
It is not hard to see that in general, MBA preferences may fail to be biseparable, even though they induce a cardinal and affine utility u . The following example illustrates.
Example 2 On an arbitrary state space S and X = + , consider a smooth-ambiguity preference
for some event A ∈ Σ, and φ(α) = log(α) (so that ambiguity aversion is decreasing in α). Denote by I u the normalized functional representing these preferences: that is, I u (a ) = e 10 Consequently, under biseparability, the restriction of the normalized functional I to binary acts is also independent of u , even though, for general acts, this is not generally the case. As it is argued in Ghirardato et al. (2005) , I is invariant with respect to u for all acts f in our Anscombe-Aumann framework only if we assume that the preference satisfies Certainty Independence.
14 Finally, consider now the bet 1 A 0 that pays 1 USD if A obtains and 0 otherwise. We have
If on the other hand we consider the bet 2 A1, then
Thus, if we apply Eq. (4) to the bet 1 A 0, we conclude that ρ(A) equals 0.43301; however, if we consider the bet 2 A 1 instead, Eq. (4) implies that ρ(A) should be 0.47902: contradiction.
We therefore see that in this case ρ(A) cannot be defined independently of the choice of x y , a violation of biseparability. Intuitively, since φ(α) = log(α) displays decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion, as we increase the prizes involved, we get a less conservative willingness to bet on the ambiguous event A.
While invariance of I and ρ to transformations of the utility function does not obtain, for MBA preferences we can still obtain a "locally" biseparable representation of , in the following sense. Fix a pair (I , u ) that represents , with I normalized. Given a bet x A y on an event A ∈ Σ (with x y ), define
The uniqueness properties of the ambiguity index α(·) ensure that the quantity ρ x ,y is independent of the utility function adopted (cf. Proposition 5). It is then easy to verify that, when restricted to binary acts (bets) of the form x A y (for arbitrary A ∈ Σ), the preference has the representation
With this notation, an MBA preference is biseparable if ρ x ,y does not depend upon x and y ; we may call such a preference MBis, for Monotone and Biseparable. It is natural to ask if an additional axiom identifies the MBis subclass of MBA preferences. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) describe and axiomatize a model of preferences that turns out to have exactly the type of separability we need. The main axiom is the following; recall that an act f ∈ is binary iff it is of the form f = x A y for some A ∈ Σ and x , y ∈ X (not necessarily distinct or strictly ranked).
Axiom 7 (Binary Certainty Independence) For all f , g ∈ , with f , g binary acts, x ∈ X , and
We then have the following characterization; see also Theorem 9 in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) .
Proposition 9 An MBA preference satisfies Axiom 7 if and only if it is biseparable.
Ambiguity of acts and events
This section contains the main contributions of this paper. We first propose a notion of unambiguous acts which strengthens that of crisp acts (cf. §4), and characterize it for MBA preferences. Second, we employ this notion to define unambiguous events, and again provide characterizations. Armed with the characterization of unambiguous acts and events for MBA preferences, we proceed to investigate some consequences of such characterizations. In particular, we observe how, in the spirit of Epstein and Zhang (2001) , the derived set of unambiguous events can be used to provide a "fully subjective" theory of expected utility (different from the one they propose). We finally generalize Marinacci (2002) 's result on the consistency of probabilistic sophistication and ambiguity aversion to non (α-)MEU preferences.
Throughout this section, it is convenient to adopt an explicit notation for simple acts. Fix a finite partition {E 1 , . . . , E n } of S in Σ, and corresponding prizes x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X . The act that delivers prize x i in states s ∈ E i , for i = 1, . . . , n, will be denoted by {x 1 , E 1 ; . . . ; x n , E n }. As before, if n = 2, then {x 1 , E ; x 2 ,S \ E } will be denoted simply by x 1 E x 2
Unambiguous acts
We begin by motivating our definition of unambiguous acts. In keeping with the intuition that ambiguity is revealed by non-neutral attitudes toward hedging, a starting point is to require that unambiguous acts be crisp. To elaborate, we surely want the set of unambiguous acts to include all constant acts; it then seems plausible to require that this set also include acts that, like constants, are revealed not to provide any hedging opportunities.
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However, we would like the notion of unambiguous acts to capture an additional intuition.
Consider the three-color Ellsberg urn, containing 30 red balls and 60 green and blue balls, in unspecified proportions. It is natural to regard a "bet on red" as an unambiguous act, because the partition of the state space S = {r, g ,b } it induces-the winning event {r } and the losing event {g ,b }-consists of events whose relative likelihood is intuitively clear. But, by the same token, a "bet on not red" should also be regarded as unambiguous.
More broadly, if two acts f , g induce the same partition of the state space S, in the sense that, as usual, for all states s , s ∈ S, f (s ) = f (s ) if and only if g (s ) = g (s ), then either they are both ambiguous, or else they are both unambiguous. In other words, the property of being ambiguous or unambiguous depends upon the partition an act induces, rather than on the specific assignment of distinct prizes to different elements of the induced partition. The following example demonstrates that this additional, natural requirement has bite.
Example 3 Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, and consider the set C generated by the priors P = [1/3, 1/4, 5/12]
and Q = [1/4, 5/12, 1/3] and the act f = {x , {s 1 }; y , {s 2 }; z , {s 3 }}, with u (
, so f is crisp (cf. Corollary 4). However, the act g = {y , {s 1 }; z , {s 2 }; x , {s 3 }}, which "permutes" the payoffs delivered by f but is measurable with respect to the same partition, satisfies P(u • g ) = Q(u • g ): hence, it is not crisp. Now, if unambiguous acts must be crisp (as we wish to assume), then g must be deemed ambiguous. Since f and g induce the same partition of S, the preceding argument then implies that we must deem f ambiguous as well.
Observe that, in Example 3, the prizes delivered by the acts f and g are the same; this is the sense in which g is a "permutation" of f . We formalize this notion of permutation below.
The discussion so far suggests the following loose provisional definition: an act is unambiguous if all its "permutations" are crisp. However, a final difficulty must be overcome. Acts map states to consequences; on the other hand, hedging considerations involve utility tradeoffs. Hence, if we deem f unambiguous, and f (s ) ∼ g (s ) for all s ∈ S, we should deem g unambiguous, too. Indeed, it turns out that, in the approach we pursue, this is necessary, not just natural, in order to avoid paradoxical conclusions:
Example 4 Consider again the 3-color Ellsberg urn, with S = {r, g ,b }; consider prizes x , y , z
, and let f = {x , {r }; y , {g }; z , {b }}, so f is, intuitively, a bet on red, even though strictly speaking it is not a binary act. Finally, consider the set C generated by P = [1/3, 2/3, 0] and Q = [1/3, 0, 2/3]. In keeping with the Ellsbergian intuition, we wish to deem f unambiguous; however, consider the act f = {y , {r }; x , {g }; z , {b }}, which delivers the same prizes as f and is measurable with respect to the same partition. Then
As in the previous example, f must be deemed ambiguous, and hence our provisional definition would deem f ambiguous as well, which seems counterintuitive.
Our definition of unambiguous act takes care of the difficulty illustrated in Example 4 by defining permutations in terms of utility levels instead of payoffs.
Definition 2 An act g ∈ is a -permutation of another act f ∈ if:
An act f ∈ is unambiguous if every -permutation of f is crisp. The class of all unambiguous acts is denoted by .
Note that, if preferences are represented by a Bernoulli utility u on X , then conditions (i) and
The following result shows that the set is the largest set of crisp acts which is "closed" with respect to -permutations.
Proposition 10
Given an MBA preference , is the largest set of crisp acts such that if f ∈ and g ∈ is a -permutation of f , then g ∈ .
The main result of this section shows that unambiguous acts have a sharp characterization in terms of their expected utility with respect to probabilities in the set C :
Theorem 11 For any f ∈ , the following statements are equivalent:
Statement (ii) is possibly the most useful, and powerful, characterization of unambiguous acts. In words, an act is unambiguous if and only if the events in the partition it induces have the same probability according to all members of the set C . This in particular implies that, if f is unambiguous and g induces the same partition as f , but possibly delivers entirely different prizes, then g is also unambiguous.
Unambiguous events
It is natural to define unambiguous any event with respect to which unambiguous acts are measurable (a similar approach to defining unambiguous events was earlier advocated by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)).
Definition 3
The class of unambiguous events is
Analogously to what we had for unambiguous acts, we can offer two characterization results for unambiguous events. The first is a behavioral result:
Proposition 12 For any A ∈ Σ, A ∈ Λ if and only if for any x y , the act x A y is crisp.
By part (ii) of Theorem 11, arguing as we did after the statement of that Theorem, the quantifier "for all x y " could be changed to "for some x y " without invalidating the result. This makes the behavioral identification of the set Λ conceptually easier, and it also conforms with our intuition that ambiguity is a property of the event partition the act is based on.
Thus, an event A is unambiguous if it is such that any bet on such event -i.e., any act of the form x A y for x y -cannot be used to hedge the ambiguity in another act (Nehring (2001) proposes a different definition which turns out to be equivalent to Def. 3, and hence also to an earlier one he presented in Nehring (1999) ). Conversely, A is ambiguous if x A y ∼ * z for any z ∈ X ; that is, if x A y ∼ z , then there exist λ ∈ (0, 1], g ∈ such that λx A y
The second result shows that unambiguous events have a simple and intuitive characterization in terms of the probabilities in C . (Notice that this is independent of the normalization chosen for u .) There is also a natural connection with the "local" willingness to bet ρ x ,y defined in Eq. (6).
Proposition 13 For any A ∈ Σ, A ∈ Λ if and only if P(A)
As a consequence, for all MBA preferences, the collection Λ has a simple and intuitive structure (cf. Zhang (2002) and Nehring (1999) ).
It is natural to surmise that any act whose upper level sets are unambiguous events should be deemed unambiguous (cf., e.g., Epstein and Zhang (2001) ). Proposition 13, paired with Theorem 10, allows us to show that this is indeed the case.
Corollary 15
For any act f ∈ , f ∈ if and only if its upper preference sets {s ∈ S : f (s ) x } belong to Λ for all x ∈ X .
Nehring (1999) shows that, if S is finite and I is a Choquet integral (so that the set C can be simply characterized; see Example 17 in GMM), the set Λ can be further characterized as follows:
where ρ = ρ x ,y , which in the CEU case is independent of the choice of x and y . It follows that for CEU preferences Λ is an algebra, a result that shows that such preferences cannot be used to model some potentially interesting ambiguity situations (see for instance the 4-color example in Zhang (2002)). Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) The definition given above enjoys two main advantages over this earlier proposal: it is more general, because it applies to any MBA preference, and, more importantly, it is more accurate, as it allows to distinguish between events which are truly (perceived) unambiguous and those that appear to be because of the behavior of the decision maker's ambiguity attitude. The following result illustrates this point. Recall that ρ x ,y (·) of Eq. (6) is the local willingness-to-bet index defined in Eq. (6), and α(·) is the the ambiguity index of Eq. (2).
Ambiguity and willingness to bet

Proposition 16
Given an MBA preference with normalized representation (I , u ) and any x , y ∈ X such that x y , the following are equivalent for any A ∈ Σ:
To interpret, an event satisfies the condition ρ x ,y (A) + ρ x ,y (A c ) = 1 for some x and y (which is the natural generalization of the Ghirardato-Marinacci condition to MBA preferences) in exactly two cases: either 1) A is unambiguous, or 2) A is not unambiguous, but the decision maker's ambiguity index in evaluating the bets x A y and x A c y behaves so as to perfectly compensate the ambiguity aversion (resp. appeal) revealed in evaluating x A y by evaluating the complementary bet x A c y in an ambiguity seeking (resp. averse) fashion. That is, ρ x ,y (A) + ρ x ,y (A c ) = 1 could be satisfied by a pure mathematical accident, if the decision maker's ambiguity attitude is "inconsistent" in just the right way.
On the other hand, suppose that the preference satisfies (for the given x and y ) for every
Then ρ x ,y (A) + ρ x ,y (A c ) = 1 if and only if A is unambiguous. For instance, this is the case of a decision maker for whom α > 1/2 uniformly. The following example shows one case of such consistency of ambiguity aversion with CEU preferences.
Example 5 Consider the following variant of the Ellsberg "3-color" paradox. An urn contains 120 balls, 30 of which are red, while the remaining 90 are either blue, green or yellow. A decision maker facing this problem has a CEU preference represented by a (non-constant and convexranged) utility u and a capacity ρ on S = {r, g ,b, y }, 11 where
with ν a capacity on {g ,b, y } defined as follows: ν ( ) = 0, ν ({g ,b, y }) = 1 and
Observe first that Core(ρ) contains (at least) the uniform probability on S. Therefore, is ambiguity averse in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , though ρ is not supermodular. Observe next that ρ({r }) = 1/4 and ρ({g ,b, y }) = 3/4. That is {{r }, {g ,b, y }} is a candidate for being an unambiguous partition. According to Proposition 16, this will be the case if α({r }) + α({g ,b, y }) = 1. Using Example 17 of GMM it can be checked after some tedious calculation that for
It follows that Λ = { ,S, {r }, {g ,b, y }} as expected. Moreover,
That is, satisfies α(A) + α(A c ) = 1 for any B ∈ Σ \ Λ.
It turns out that Eq. (7) has a simple behavioral characterization:
11 Notice that such preference is biseparable, so that ρ does not depend on the choice of x and y and α(u •x Ay ) = α(u • x Ay ) ≡ α(A) for every x y and x y .
Proposition 17
Given an MBA preference and x , y ∈ X such that x y and given A ∈ Σ \ Λ, eq. (7) holds for some normalized (I , u ) representing if and only if
where for any f ∈ we denote by c f one of its certainty equivalents.
We shall see that this result proves useful in characterizing situations in which complement additivity is a full "marker" for the lack of ambiguity (see, e.g., Proposition 20 below).
We conclude this discussion by observing that the definition of the set Λ and some of the notation and terminology introduced in the previous paragraphs, allow us to provide an alternative characterization of MBis preferences complementing Prop. 9. If there are "enough" unambiguous events, Savage's Postulate P4-which is in general weaker than Binary Certainty
Independence-suffices to guarantee that the preference is biseparable. A piece of notation
Proposition 18 Given an MBA preference with relevant priors C and unambiguous events Λ, suppose that C (Λ) is dense in (0, 1). Then the following are equivalent:
(i ) there exists a unique capacity ρ such that eq. (4) holds for any binary act x A y and any normalized representation (I , u ) of (i i ) satisfies Savage's P4 axiom. That is, for any A, B ∈ Σ and any x , y , x , y ∈ X such that x y and x y , x A y x B y iff x A y x B y
A "fully subjective" Expected Utility model
As observed by Epstein and Zhang (2001) , there is an important sense in which Savage's (1954) construction of subjective probability is not "fully subjective." In fact, Savage (and later Machina and Schmeidler (1992) , in their extension of Savage's construction) assumes exogenously that the probability which represents the decision maker's beliefs is defined on the whole σ-algebra Σ. Examples like Ellsberg's paradox suggest that a natural extension of Savage's philosophy might be to define probabilities wherever the decision maker feels comfortable, and avoid doing so otherwise, thus making also the domain of the probability charge "subjective." Epstein and Zhang propose a definition of unambiguous event, and in the spirit of Machina and 23 Schmeidler (1992) provide an axiomatization of preferences whose induced likelihood relations are represented by a probability charge on the set of unambiguous events -which under such axiomatic restrictions (with a minor amendment, see Kopylov (2002) ) is a λ-system. Kopylov (2002) provides an analogous result using a slightly different set of axioms, generating weaker structural restrictions on the set of unambiguous events (it is what he calls a "mosaic").
The results obtained thus far allows us to provide a different "fully subjective" version of Savage's model, summarized below (cf. also Nehring (2002, Proposition 1)): 12
Proposition 19
If is an MBA preference on , then there is a λ-system of events Λ ⊆ Σ such that has an SEU representation (with utility u ) on the set of the Λ-measurable acts. That is, there exist a probability charge P :
Moreover, P is uniquely defined on Λ.
We thus conclude that the sets of unambiguous events and acts derived above provide us with natural "endogenous" domains for a theory of subjective expected utility maximization.
The decision maker assigns sharply defined probabilities only to those events that are revealed unambiguous by his behavior, assigning interval-valued probabilities to all the other events.
Observe that nothing in our analysis prevents the trivial case Λ = { ,S}, in which SEU maximization never really appears. This is a difference with Epstein and Zhang's analysis, in which the set of unambiguous events is very rich by axiomatic requirement on the preferences.
As it is apparent from the statement, there is a sense in which our requirement on preferences is more stringent than Epstein-Zhang's. We look for a set of acts on which the preference satisfies the full-blown SEU model of Savage, rather than just being probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler. The difference has more than just theoretical significance: The Epstein-Zhang construction is based on a definition of unambiguous event which implies that Λ = Σ, i.e., every event in unambiguous, when the decision maker is probabilistically sophisticated. However, as discussed at length in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , a probabilistically sophisticated decision maker might still be reacting to the presence of ambiguity. The only way to make sure that he is not is to have a (rich enough) collection of events which are exogenously known to be unambiguous, as a calibration device. Therefore, the conclusion that all events are unambiguous to a probabilistically sophisticated decision maker hinges on an exogenous notion of ambiguity of events which we dispense with.
A problem that is common to all such "fully subjective" approaches is that the domain of the probability charge may be far from being unique. That is, while our set Λ is certainly unique, it is not true that one cannot find another set of events on which has an SEU representation. Just to make a simple example, suppose that is a CEU preference on a finite S, and consider any monotonic class like Γ = {{s 1 }, {s 1 , s 2 }, . . . ,S}. Given the family of acts which are Γ-measurable, there is a probability P which represents , as all such acts are comonotonic. On the other hand, one would have a hard time arguing that Γ is a natural domain for a "fully subjective" theory. But even imposing structural requirements on the domain (e.g., that it be a λ-system) is not enough to uniquely identify it in general. 13 There might be a multiplicity of "endogenous domains" for subjective probability, so that the choice of one must be motivated by considerations other than just finding where the decision maker is capable of formulating sharp probabilities.
Unambiguous events and weak probabilistic sophistication
A result of Marinacci (2002) shows that preferences which have an α-MEU representation (with constant α = 1/2) and are probabilistically sophisticated with respect to a nonatomic prior collapse to SEU as soon as the set of priors used in the representation induces a "nontrivial" Λ (see below). Indeed, the result requires an even weaker condition than probabilistic sophistication, as spelled out below. We us the following terminology: A probability P ∈ ba 1 (Σ) is convex-ranged on Σ if for any B ∈ Σ and any α ∈ [0, P(B )], there exists A ⊆ B , A ∈ Σ such that
Definition 4 A binary relation on has weak probabilistic beliefs if there exists a convex-13 A similar observation is made by Kopylov (2002) about his results, although he uses the weaker notion of mosaic.
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ranged P * ∈ ba 1 (Σ) and x y such that, for all A, B ∈ Σ,
Thus, a preference has weak probabilistic beliefs if the indifference sets of the likelihood relation obtained by considering bets on events (with fixed payoffs x y ) contain the level sets of the probability P * . The condition is weaker than probabilistic sophistication, as it does not require full agreement between the ranking induced by P * and the likelihood ordering. 14 We show that Marinacci's result generalizes to a broad class of MBA preferences violating the constant ambiguity index assumption. It is only needed that ambiguity attitudes over bets do not fluctuate in an "inconsistent" fashion; that is, that condition (8) holds.
Proposition 20
Let be an MBA preference with relevant priors C and unambiguous events Λ. Suppose that satisfies condition (8) for any A ∈ Σ \ Λ, and that C only contains probability measures and satisfies C (Λ) = {0, 1}. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i ) has weak probabilistic beliefs.
is an SEU preference, whose beliefs are represented by a nonatomic probability measure P * .
Marinacci's original result is an impossibility statement: under the assumptions of his theorem, probabilistic sophistication is compatible with α-MEU preferences only in the degenerate case of EU preferences. Our extension shows that Marinacci's result is indeed much more sweeping than that. In particular, it applies also to CEU preferences. Of course, the discussion in Marinacci (2002) on the importance of the assumptions in the theorem still applies.
In particular, we want to emphasize a simple example of a class of CEU preferences which is probabilistic sophisticated without being SEU.
Example 6 On a state space (S, Σ), with S at least countably infinite, consider a nonatomic probability measure P and a strictly convex transformation function ϕ :
and satisfying ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1. Then a CEU preference with (some utility u and) capacity ρ = ϕ(P) -a subjective Rank-Dependent EU preference-is probabilistically sophisticated and not SEU. Notice that is MBA (indeed, invariant biseparable) and satisfies condition (7), since it has α ≡ 1 by the strict convexity of ϕ. However, it can be checked that for we have Λ = { ,S}, so that there is no nontrivial unambiguous event.
We close by recalling an axiom from GMM which can be employed to ensure that, as in the assumptions of Proposition 20, all the elements of the set C are probability measures, rather than charges:
if z ∈ X is such that y z , then y * x A n z for some n.
It is immediate to see that Proposition B.1 in GMM extends to MBA preferences, showing that in the presence of the previous axioms, Monotone Continuity is necessary and sufficient for C to contain only probability measures.
A Proofs of the results in Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We just prove the necessity part of the statement. Sufficiency follows from routine arguments.
Since satisfies Weak Order, Risk Independence, Archimedean, and by Kreps (1988, Theorem 5.11) , it follows that there exists a nonconstant and affine function u : X → such that x y if and only if u (x ) ≥ u y . We next show that each f in admits a certainty equivalent.
Claim. For each f ∈ there exists x f ∈ X such that x f ∼ f .
Proof of the Claim. Since f (S) is a finite subset of X and since is a Weak Order and it satisfies Monotonicity, it follows that there exist two consequences x 1 and x 0 in X such that x 1 f x 0 .
We denote by
follows. Otherwise, we have that x 1 f x 0 . Define
Since satisfies Archimedean, it follows that U and L are nonempty. Moreover, since satisfies Weak Order and u is affine, we have that
Defineᾱ = inf α∈U α andβ = sup β ∈L β . By (9), it is immediate to see thatᾱ ≥β . Since U and L are nonempty, we have that 1 >ᾱ ≥β > 0. Then, we have three cases:
1. xᾱ ∼ f . The statement follows by imposing x f = xᾱ.
2.ᾱ ∈ U . It follows that xᾱ f . Since satisfies Archimedean, it follows that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
thus λᾱ ∈ U and λᾱ <ᾱ. This is a contradiction withᾱ = inf α∈U α.
3.ᾱ ∈ U and xᾱ ∼ f . Since satisfies Weak Order, it follows that f xᾱ, that is,ᾱ ∈ L. Sincē α ≥β = sup β ∈L β , this implies thatᾱ =β . Since satisfies Archimedean, it follows that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
First, observe that I is well defined. Indeed, pick a ∈ B 0 (Σ, u (X )). Consider f , g ∈ such that
Since u represents over X , it follows that f (s ) ∼ g (s ) for all s ∈ S. By Monotonicity, we can conclude that f ∼ g .
Since satisfies Weak Order, it follows that x f ∼ x g . Thus, we have that
Since a ≥ b and satisfies Monotonicity, it follows that f g . Since satisfies Weak Order and u represents on X , we thus obtain that
Next, we show that I is normalized. Pick k ∈ u (X ). By assumption, there exists x ∈ X such that
Notice that x f can be chosen to be equal to x . By definition of I , it follows that
Pick f , g ∈ . Since satisfies Weak Order and u represents restricted to X , we have that
Finally, we are left to prove the continuity of I . First, observe that I (B 0 (Σ, u (X ))) = u (X ). Consider a ,b ∈ B 0 (Σ, u (X )) such that a ≤ b and I (b ) > k where k ∈ . It follows that there exist f and g in such that a = u • f and b = u • g . We have two cases:
. This implies that there exists x ∈ X such that u (x ) = k . By (10), we have that g x f . Since satisfies Archimedean, it follows that there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that
Since u is affine and by (10), we have that
It follows that I satisfies condition (iv) of C3M Lemma 45. By Proposition 46 of C3M, it follows that I is lower semicontinuous. Upper semicontinuity follows by a symmetric argument.
The uniqueness part of the statement follows from routine arguments.
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B Proofs of the results in Section 4 B.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Assume that satisfies Weak Order, Risk Independence, Archimedean, Monotonicity. By Proposition 1, it follows that satisfies Continuity as defined in C3M.
(i) implies (ii). By C3M (Theorem 3), if satisfies Convexity then there exists a nonconstant affine function u : X → and a function G :
is well defined and such that
. By the definition of G t , P f and
Summing up, if we define the binary relation ≥ f on by
then we have that f ≥ f g implies that f g . Since f was arbitrarily chosen, the statement follows.
(ii) implies (i). By Proposition 1, it follows that there exists a nonconstant affine function u : X → and a normalized, monotonic, and continuous functional I :
Notice that G (·, P) : → (−∞, ∞] is an increasing function for all P ∈ b a 1 (Σ). Moreover, observe
for all f ∈ and for all P ∈ b a 1 (Σ). It follows that
Pick f ∈ . By assumption, there exists a SEU preference ≥ f such that
In other words, we have that there existsP ∈ b a 1 (Σ) such that
By definition of G , this implies that
Since f was arbitrarily chosen, we can conclude that
Since G (·, P) is an increasing function for all P ∈ b a 1 (Σ), it follows that U P (k ) is closed under convex combinations for all P ∈ b a 1 (Σ). By (11), it follows that f , g ∈ U P (k ) for all P ∈ b a 1 (Σ).
This implies that
By (11), we can conclude that I u
f and g were arbitrarily chosen, it follows that satisfies Convexity.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose is biseparable, so ρ x ,y is independent of x , y . Then, for all x , y ∈ X with x y and all
; the first equality follows from monotonicity. Thus,
Now, for any two binary acts f , g , we can always choose A, A ∈ Σ so that f = x A y and g = x A y , with x y and x y . Then, for all z ∈ X and λ ∈ (0, 1], λf Now consider x , y , x , y ∈ X with x y and x y . There exist α, β ∈ , with α > 0, such
are the A -certainty equivalents of f A and g A respectively, u (c g A ) = αu (c f A ) + β as well. Eq. (6) and the fact that αu (x ) + β = u (x ) and
Hence, a set function ρ : Σ → [0, 1] that satisfies Eq. (4) can be uniquely defined; it is then straightforward to verify that ρ is in fact a capacity.
C Proofs of the results in Sec. 5
Throughout this appendix we write C (A) (resp. C (A)) in place of C (1 A 0) (resp. C (1 A 0)). We also write α u • f in lieu of α(u • f ). Notice that for expositional reasons, the results are proved in a different order than that in the main text.
We also make a useful observation. Call reduced an act
Given any non-reduced act f , we observe that there is a reduced act which, while being state-by-state indifferent to f , "simplifies" it by restricting its range so that it only contains non-indifferent payoffs. A -reduction g of f is a reduced act g = {x 1 , A 1 ; ...; x n , A n }, with x 1 x 2 ... x n and {A 1 , ..., A n } a partition of S in Σ, such that g (s ) ∼ f (s ) for all s ∈ S. Finally, given a reduced act f = {x 1 , A 1 ; ...; x n , A n }, with x 1 x 2 ... x n and {A 1 , ..., A n } a partition of S in Σ, and a permutation σ of {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, define the permuted act f σ as f σ = {σ(x 1 ), A 1 ; ...; σ(x n ), A n }.
The following lemma is immediately verified:
Lemma 21 Given an MBA preference , f is unambiguous if and only if there is some -reduction g of f for which g σ is crisp for every permutation σ of g 's payoffs.
Proof: Note that a -reduction of an act f is a -permutation according to Def. 2. Hence, if f is unambiguous and g is a -reduction of g , every permutation of g is a -permutation of f , and therefore it is crisp. Conversely, letf be a -permutation of f , and let g be a -reduction of f for which g σ is crisp for every permutation σ. In particular, there is a permutationσ such that gσ(s ) ∼f (s ) for all s . By assumption, gσ is crisp, so gσ ∼ * x for some x ∈ X . But then, by monotonicity of * , alsof ∼ * x , i.e.f is crisp. Thus, f is unambiguous.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 10
Let be the set defined in the statement of the proposition. More precisely, let be the union of all sets of crisp acts that are closed under -permutations. Notice that, if f is crisp, the set of all -permutations of f is one such set , because the -permutation relation is an equivalence. Furthermore, all constants are crisp; thus, is both well-defined and non-empty.
We will prove that = . We begin with the observation that any act f whose -permutations are all crisp must belong to . In fact, if f / ∈ , one could add f and all its -permutations to , thus obtaining a larger set and contradicting the definition of . Conversely, if f ∈ , then any -permutation of f must be in , hence crisp. This proves that f is unambiguous.
C.2 Proofs of Propositions 12 and 13, and of Corollary 14
A lemma first:
Lemma 22 Let a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n ,b 1 ,b 2 , ...,b n , c ∈ be such that n h=1 a h b σ(h) = c for all permutations σ ∈ Per(n). Then either a 1 = a 2 = ... = a n or b 1 = b 2 = ... = b n .
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there exist i , j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a i = a j and k , l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that b k = b l . Consider a permutation σ such that σ(i ) = k and σ(j ) = l , and the permutation σ = σ(k l ) obtained applying σ and then switching around k and l . It follows that
contradiction.
C.2.1 Proofs of Propositions 12 and 13.
We prove the two Propositions by showing that the following statements are equivalent for any A ∈ Σ:
(i i i ) For every x y , the act x A y is crisp.
(i v ) For some x y , the act x A y is crisp.
Therefore, there is f ∈ and x ∈ X such that A = {s ∈ S :
Therefore, by the Lemma above, either P(
Therefore b = 0 and A i satisfies condition (i i ) for any for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. As A ∈ {A i : i = 1, . . . , n}, the conclusion follows. In the latter case, n = 1 and A = { f ∼ x } is then either S or (depending on whether x ∼ x 1 or not). Clearly P(S) = Q(S) = 1 and P( ) = Q( ) = 0 for any P,Q ∈ C , so that once again (i i ) follows, also proving that { ,S} ∈ Λ. Notice finally that if P(A) = Q(A) for all P,Q ∈ C , it then follows from the definition of ρ x ,y that ρ x ,y (A) = P(A) = Q(A).
for all P,Q ∈ C . That is, x A y is crisp.
: Let x y be s.t. x A y is crisp. We want to show that f = x A y ∈ . This is the case if f has a -reduction whose permutations are all crisp. But f is a reduced act, and the only permutation of f is g = x A c y . Since f is crisp,
and g is also crisp. Notice that this argument also shows that if A ∈ Λ, then A c ∈ Λ.
C.2.2 Proof of Corollary 14.
We have proved properties 1 and 2 of a λ-system in the course of proving the previous two propositions, so we only need to show property 3. If A, B ∈ Λ and A ∩ B = , for all P,Q ∈ C ,
C.3 Proofs of Theorem 11 and Corollary 15
Using the definition of Λ and the characterization of Proposition 12, the statements to be shown equivalent are reformulated as follows:
The equivalence of (i ) and (v i i ) follows immediately from the argument used to show (i ) ⇒ (i i ) in appendix C.2.1 and from Proposition 13. We shall now prove that statements
Hence, {s ∈ S : f (s ) x } is a disjoint union of elements of Λ, which is a λ-system.
Notice that u (X ) is an interval. Let a ∈ . If a ∈ u (X ), say a = u (x ), then {s ∈ S : u • f (s ) ≥ a } = {s ∈ S : f (s ) x } ∈ Λ. Else, either a < t for all t ∈ u (X ), and then {s ∈ S : u • f (s ) ≥ a } = S ∈ Λ, or a > t for all t ∈ u (X ), and then {s ∈ S : u • f (s ) ≥ a } = ∈ Λ. 
C.4.2 Proposition 17
Notice that under the representation assumptions, for the given x y eq. (8) concluding the proof.
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C.4.3 Proposition 18
We begin by recalling that, given a normalized representation (I , u ) and x y , x A y x B y iff α u (x A y )(C (A) − C (A)) + C (A) ≥ α u (x B y )(C (B ) − C (B )) + C (B )
with the left-hand (resp. right-hand) side collapsing to P(A) = C (A) = C (A) (resp. P(B ) = C (B ) = C (B )) if A ∈ Λ (resp. B ∈ Λ). Clearly, if there is a unique ρ for which Eq. (4) holds, α u (x A y ) does not depend on x or y . Hence, the implication (i) ⇒ (ii) is trivial. We prove that (ii) ⇒ (i).
It is enough to show that α u (x A y ) = α u (x A y ) for every u and x y , x y : this implies that ρ x ,y (A) = ρ x ,y (A) whenever x y , x y , so a set function ρ : Σ → [0, 1] that satisfies Eq.
(4) can be uniquely defined; it is then straightforward to verify that ρ is a capacity. 
C.5 Proof of Proposition 20
The implication (i i ) ⇒ (i ) being trivial, we prove (i ) ⇒ (i i ). By weak probabilistic beliefs (assumption (i )), there exists x y and a convex-ranged probability charge P * such that for all A, B ∈ Σ P * (A) = P * (B ) =⇒ ρ x ,y (A) = ρ x ,y (B )
Consider now A ∈ Λ such that C (A) = C (A) = ρ x ,y (A) ∈ (0, 1). It follows that P * (A) ∈ (0, 1), since P * (A) = 0 (resp. P * (A) = 1) implies P * (A) = P * ( ) (resp. P * (A) = P * (S)), which in turn implies by (i ) that ρ x ,y (A) = ρ x ,y ( ) = 0 (resp. ρ x ,y (A) = ρ x ,y (S) = 1), a contradiction.
Let B ∈ Σ be such that P * (B ) = P * (A), so that (i ) implies ρ x ,y (B ) = ρ x ,y (A) and ( We also know that satisfies condition (8) for any A ∈ Σ \ Λ. It therefore follows from Propositions 17 and 16 that ρ x ,y (B ) + ρ x ,y (B c ) = 1 implies B ∈ Λ, so that ρ x ,y (B ) = P(B ) for any P ∈ C .
We can thus conclude that with the chosen A ∈ Λ we have for every B ∈ Σ and P ∈ C , P * (B ) = P * (A) =⇒ P(B ) = P(A)
so that P * = P follows from Theorem 2 of Marinacci (2002) . Since this is true for any P ∈ C -that is, C = {P * }-we conclude that is a SEU preference with probability P * .
